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Legitimation Crisis, Reifying Human Rights
and the Norm-Creating Power of the
Factual:* Reply to "Reifying Law: Let
Them be Lions"
Gunnar Beck**
I. Reifying Law, Jurisdictio, and Human Rights
Professor Backer's Article marks a much needed and refreshing
change from much of the over-normatised and under-reasoned
contemporary discourse in international and comparative constitutional
and human rights law. Backer openly concedes that he is not interested
in the perennial but unanswerable question concerning the "true"
meaning of law as an abstract concept, but only in law as a protean
pluralistic concept which is constantly transformed, reified and
reincarnated in different guises. Aiming at sketching out the broad
trends in the transformation of the meaning of law as a belief system
from the seventeenth century to the twenty-first century, Backer
indirectly develops a new and enticing non-reductionist conception of
law as politics "by other means."
For Backer, questions regarding the "right" meaning of law are both
fruitless and never ending, because law cannot be reduced to a fixed set
of particular characteristics or normative principles. There is, therefore,
not one right meaning and conception of law, but many. Although at any
given time the meaning of law may be settled because there is a
congruence as to its ultimate source, authority, scope and limits amongst
all those concerned with making, enforcing and obeying it, such
settlements do not last because they are either superseded by, or more
* This quotation which is translated from German where it reads die normative
prdgende Kraft des Faktischen is generally attributed to Carl Schmitt although the author
has been unable to locate the precise source.
** The author is a senior lecturer in law in the University of London, and a
parliamentary legal adviser in EU law at the Commons of Commons, London. He can be
contacted at gb 18@soas.ac.uk or beckg@parliament.uk.
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gradually evolve into different settlements and so ad infinitum. Whilst at
any period of relative stability there will be a broad agreement as to the
prevailing conception of law, no such agreement exists over time and
there is no vantage point from which to lay down the one true conception
of law over time. The meaning of law is always and everywhere tied up
with variable, unstable and non-reductionist normative belief systems
and structures of perception. This makes law an essentially contested
concept whose meaning cannot be settled but remains forever open to
reinterpretation and debate. According to this view, law as the source of
legitimate authority and coercive governance is the reification of a
distinct normative belief system, which is commonly informed by ethical
norms, customs or their ethically enriched variant of Sittlichkeit,' positive
law, economic considerations and religion, but not reducible to any one
of them. According to Backer, we are currently witnessing a seismic
shift away from a conception of law that had its heyday in the nineteenth
century towards the emergent global conception of the twenty-first
century. There are two major aspects to this shift. First, Backer notes
that law, as the discourse of legitimate authority, is moving away from
the nineteenth century notion of constitutionalism as a constraint on
ordinary law and policy-making towards norms of international law, and
especially international human rights law, as constraints on national law
and politics. Secondly, and related to the resultant erosion of the
sovereignty of the nation-state, is the emergence of private agents, e.g.,
both corporations and NGOs, as agents in the process of international
law-making, law-enforcement and self-regulation. Such private agents
may assume the role of lobbyists or self-appointed watchdogs, as in the
case of NGOs, or that of actors driving and shaping emergent standards
of the international legal order constrained invariably, as everything else,
by the discourse of economics.
Unlike many traditional conceptions of law, Backer's notion of law
can accommodate these changes. His notion of law is neither
constrained by the preconceptions of traditional statehood and national
sovereignty, nor does it yield to the reductionist desire to define law in
terms of ethics, command, custom, and positive law. Although, law
evidently is connected with each of these, it ultimately remains
autonomous. For law deals with who has the final say, and the factual
agreement between those who claim that authority and those who accept
it, is ultimately a political phenomenon informed by each of these other
1. This term refers to the concept of "ethical life" furthered by Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. See Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegeU (last visited Dec. 11,
2007).
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normative systems, which is distinct from other political phenomena.
Backer, unlike many other legal theorists, embraces this notion of law as
a sui generis normative system. Faithful to Bishop Butler's timeless
dictum, Backer does justice to law by not denying that "everything is
what it is and not another thing."
Backer's Article opens many promising avenues for further
conceptual analysis and empirical investigation. I wish to content myself
with mentioning two. First, Backer convincingly traces modem
conceptions of law as an autonomous set of normative limits on state
power back to Bracton's notion ofjurisdictio. But there is an alternative
genealogy which locates its source in the natural law tradition. The issue
that Backer does not address, is which of the two--customary common
law or an ethically or religiously grounded model of the individual and
his ends-ultimately provides a more convincing framework for
restraining gubernaculum. For, as Justice Scalia not unconvincingly
shows, judicial law-making in the absence of either lacks foundational
solidity. It remains to be asked whether such a foundation can still be
provided in the absence of a unifying normative or social framework, or
whether, ultimately, in modem times the only credible reason for
dividing law-making authority between different agencies remains the
need for separation and diffusion of power. Yet, where law is concerned,
such division also poses a legitimation problem regarding the
concentration of power in private hands, which is not subject to
institutional checks and balances. Secondly, half way through his Article
Backer provides a fascinating overview of how law is redefining itself in
the post-national context of what he calls an emerging system of private
law. What is clear is that in this international system explanatory
devices, such as the rule of recognition, no longer provide adequate
means for analysing the sources of the specific form of authority of
legitimacy law lends to politics, nor for understanding the scope, source
and limits of legal power. What even Backer does not quite elucidate,
however, is who makes the new law in this new system and, even more
importantly, how private gubernaculum is or can still be restrained
through jurisdictio. Perhaps there are no answers except that the term
"business law" will acquire a new and all-embracing importance.
Perhaps the prime example of a comprehensive framework for
restraining gubernaculum through jurisdictio are bills of human rights
which come in two forms: constitutional guaranties restraining national
lawmakers, and treaties or conventions, which are at the heart of the
emerging law of acceptable state conduct and international criminal law
justice. In the theoretical and practical struggle for control of law as a
normative concept predicted by Backer, the central battleground will be
that of human rights. The concept of human rights is essentially
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contestable and characterised by radical ethical and linguistic
indeterminacy. The idea of value pluralism which permeates modem
conceptions ofjurisdictio is implicit in modem human rights systems and
the thinking behind it, which Backer convincingly shows makes attempts
to settle disputes about the meaning of the term "law" fruitless,
ultimately also means that the ethical foundations of human rights must
need to remain contestable, apart, that is, from "the norm-creating power
of the factual."2
Human or fundamental rights, and the two terms will henceforth be
used interchangeably, enjoy a privileged legal status in most Western
liberal democracies. Unlike ordinary legislation, human rights are not
subject to the majoritarian principle,3 and are handed down without a
vote and enforced by unrepresentative and unaccountable judges.
Arguments in favour of assigning this special legal status to human rights
and entrusting their administration to courts usually run as follows:
amongst the wider range of human goods some values merit special
protection. Such values should be granted the status of human rights.
The grounds for justifying the special legal status assigned to rights are
of such overriding importance that they merit exemption from the
democratic process, which is generally recognised as the appropriate
mechanism for resolving conflicts between competing interests, and
exclusive jurisdiction by the courts.4 Inter alia, this assumes that human
rights not only enjoy moral primacy but also meet the criteria of legal
certainty and justiciability; otherwise, the courts would be free to impose
their own values on their rights interpretations. A justification of human
rights and their privileged legal status in liberal democracies, thus,
requires both a normative and conceptual dimension. Both aspects are
inter-related and revolve around the idea of legal certainty.
A normative justification is necessary for two reasons: first, to
justify the priority of human rights over other values, and second, to
allow the judiciary to rank and balance conflicting rights, in the absence
of which, any judicial trade-off between competing rights would be
2. This quotation which is translated from German where it reads die normative
pragende Kraft des Faktischen is generally attributed to Carl Schmitt although the author
has been unable to locate the precise source.
3. In Germany, for example, where most constitutional provisions can be amended
by a special procedure, the first nineteen articles of the Basic Law have the status of
"perpetuity clauses [Ewigkeitsklauseln]," which cannot be changed for as long as the
present constitution is in place.
4. Human rights are also often conceived and justified as second order preferences
designed to protect the settled preferences of the majority against its own temporary
desires. They hold the majority in check and protect its best interests against its fleeting
opinions. The basic justificatory problem remains: which interests, values and
preferences are of such basic and lasting importance so as to justify exemption from the
normal channels of democratic politics combined with enforcement through the courts.
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morally arbitrary. The trade-off would be arbitrary in the sense that it
could not itself be justified in terms of a higher ethical reference point
from which all interests concerned could be evaluated. Without a
normative justification it would remain unclear why human rights should
take priority over other legal claims and policy objectives, as well as
what should happen if two rights conflict.
The need for a conceptual justification likewise relates to the issue
of legal certainty. Unless there can be a shared meaning of both the term
"human right," as well as of the meaning and scope of individual rights
and central concepts they represent and those justifying them, human
rights adjudication in general would lack legal certainty. Judges would
effectively make and not merely enforce rights.
This Article shows that contemporary human rights systems and
much of the thinking underlying them ultimately lack both a normative
foundation, as well as conceptual certainty. More particularly, systems
of human rights protection lack an adequate normative or rational basis
that can justify their superior legal status over other values. Such
systems generally lack a coherent foundation in a conception of human
nature as meriting respect and legal protection and instead rest-
expressly or impliedly--on the notion of value pluralism, which denies
that there is a clear hierarchy of human values and assumes that there is a
plurality of primary values which may not only conflict, but also may be
incommensurable. To the extent to which the number and scope of
pluralistic values exceeds those of the values protected by the system of
human rights, the priority accorded to human rights as opposed to the
remaining primary values which have not been denied the same legal
status, lacks a normative or rational basis. In these circumstances, the
privileged status granted to human rights over other values is morally
arbitrary. This is the central claim in Section Two of this Article.
Leaving aside the problem of justifying the original choice
favouring human rights over human values, actual human rights systems
rest--expressly or implicitly-on the premise that the proper role of the
courts consists in the application of human rights, whereas the basic
value judgments involved in defining human rights are the prerogative of
a special body, which possesses the legitimacy for laying down the
highest constitutional norms.5 It is argued in Section Three that value
pluralism is not confined to the fundamental decision of which values are
to be "the chosen ones," but resurfaces at the level of human rights
adjudication. Where human rights conflict, the idea of value pluralism
5. Depending on the relevant context and political culture, this may be the
legislature, a constitutional convention, another appropriate body or even the electorate in
toto.
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entails that there can be no objective, rational solution for balancing their
conflicting demands. Conflicts of this type can only be resolved
pragmatically.
Based on the idea of essentially contested concepts it is argued in
Section Four that conceptual uncertainty is a pervasive feature of human
rights adjudication in at least four respects. First, the concept of human
rights as a priority subset of the wider range of human goods is
essentially contestable in the sense that its meaning cannot be settled by
rational-logical argument. There is no right answer to the question of
what precisely is meant by the term human right. Second, many
concepts elevated to rights status or underlying rights are themselves
essentially contestable. There is no demonstrably correct or best
interpretation of those concepts. It follows, therefore, that the rights
which they define or underlie, are contestable. Third and fourth, it is
shown that neither the textual limitations contained in human rights
instruments nor the principles of human rights adjudication can escape
essential contestability. The combination of value pluralism and
essential contestability means that human rights adjudication inevitably
and habitually involves contestable value judgments.
At this point several possible objections and a practical point
deserve mention. First, it may be argued that conceptual vagueness is a
pervasive source of uncertainty in the law and applies to human rights
just as much as to other legal concepts such as intention, negligence,
responsibility, causality or trusts. Moreover, legal realists, in common
with linguistic philosophers, have long argued that concepts, while
having a core meaning, are contestable at the penumbra. There seems
nothing exceptional about rights in this respect. The reply to these
observations is that, whilst they are valid, rights require a special
justification simply because compared to other legal concepts they enjoy
an elevated legal status, which means that the legislature cannot adopt
legislation that would extinguish them in the same fashion in which it
could simply abolish trusts established for avoiding inheritance tax.
Furthermore, whilst legal realists in common with theorists as diverse as
Hart, Endicott, Sunstein and Carl Schmitt have all emphasised
conceptual uncertainty in the law as a source of judicial discretion,
judicial freedom of interpretation feeds not only on vagueness but
likewise on the normative contestability of human rights, which is rooted
in value pluralism. Unlike other discussions, this Article emphasises the
combined effects of conceptual and normative indeterminacy, which are
inter-related and mutually reinforcing. Together they afford the judiciary
almost unlimited freedom in human rights adjudication, subject only to
one overriding constraint, namely, that they do not challenge the
executive in politically sensitive areas such as national security, foreign
[Vol. 26:3
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defence, and fiscal policy.
Second, it can be argued that conceptual vagueness is ineliminable
while, with the erosion of religion and the loss of faith in the possibility
of a rational foundation for ethics, moral objectivism lacks widely shared
justificatory foundations. It does not follow, however, that human rights
systems operate at anything like the ineliminable minimum of linguistic
indeterminacy or that any alternative to moral objectivism, such as
relativism, pluralism, or subjectivism, has any greater foundational
justification. Nothing suggests that bills of rights could not afford
greater legal certainty if they were shorter, less obscure and more
concerned with what matters most, when, at present, judicial practice
tends to take rights seriously only where they are trivial and ignore them
where they matter most.
Third, it might also be said that it is slightly unrealistic to construct
a stark contrast between an unelected judiciary handing down
unaccountable decisions and a democratically legitimated and
accountable legislature reflecting popular wishes and opinions.
Realistically speaking, parliamentary democracy does not mean popular
sovereignty, but merely represents a safety valve that prevents popular
dissatisfaction from reaching boiling temperature. Moreover, human
rights need not be conceived as moral values of the first order, but could
equally well be, and in fact are, construed as goods most individuals
want, regardless of whatever else they may want. In this sense, human
rights are based on a kind of democratic consensus. The counter to these
objections is that human rights language simply does not reflect this
toned down version of human rights as second-order preferences, which
keep things under control when popular opinion takes an aberrant
holiday from its own considered wishes. First, judicial practice cannot
realistically be construed in this restrained, non-moralistic sense.
Second, consistent divergence between popular wishes and the lack of
genuine choice offered by the political process yielding government
policy which, in central respects, the majority does not endorse, raises
serious issues of political legitimacy and accountability in view of
foreign policy interventions in the name of international law, but
undesired by most Western electorates and tax policies that effectively
exempt the international elite from income and other taxes in any
country. Yet, neither is an argument for placing decision-making in the
hands of unelected and irremovable judges.
Case examples designed in particular to demonstrate the inadequate
moral or rational basis for many judicial distinctions in the exegesis of
human rights are drawn largely from the European Convention on
Human Rights, British cases and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, with
occasional references to Germany and other jurisdictions. From this,
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however, it does not follow that the claims of this paper are confined to
the jurisdictions discussed. On the contrary, aspects of those
jurisdictions that are sources of uncertainty specific to that legal system
and not applicable across human rights jurisdictions, such as the margin
of appreciation under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"), have been
deliberately excluded from the discussion so as not to distract from
discussion of the broader uncertainty arising from value pluralism and
conceptual uncertainty across all human rights systems.
II. Value Pluralism and the Normative Contestability of Rights
Modem conceptions of human rights have their origin in the idea of
natural rights. They share the equality and universality assumptions of
the natural law tradition but, generally speaking, no longer rest on a
monistic theory of human ends. This has created a "legitimation crisis"
for human rights: on the one hand they rest on a conception of human
beings as having certain universal rights irrespective of whether these
rights are recognised in positive law, whilst on the other hand they lack a
secure moral basis in a theory of human nature and ends, which could
sanction their authority. In its extreme form, the scepticism that has
undermined the belief in absolute truths and that has debunked both
religion and reason as sources of value and moral certainty, leads to
relativism, which is incompatible with any belief in human rights as
anything more than the very diluted sense of a set of historically and
culturally contingent dominant values in certain places at certain times.
Richard Rorty, for instance, maintains that the list of human rights can be
justified without grand foundational claims, pragmatically as historically
contingent artifacts.6 A more accurate description, however, of the
ethical position invoked or implied by most modem theories of human
rights is that of value pluralism.
The idea of value pluralism as a tragic conflict between
incommensurable values goes back to Max Weber, but it only became an
established concept in philosophical ethics through the work of Isaiah
Berlin. Central to Berlin's ethics is his rejection of monism, i.e., of the
belief that all ethical questions have an answer and that these answers are
both knowable and compatible with one another. Value pluralism, by
contrast, Berlin argues is the idea that there is no clear hierarchy of moral
ends, but a multiplicity of equally fundamental values that may not only
be incompatible but also be incommensurable. To say of two values that
they are incommensurable connotes a breakdown of transitivity. Gray
6. See Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentiment, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES (S. Shute & S. Hurley eds., New York 1993).
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defines values or options as incommensurable if "it is possible for one of
them to be improved without thereby becoming better than the other, and
if there can be another option which is better than the one, but not better
than the other, then the two original options are incommensurate. 7
More succinctly, two values are incommensurable if it cannot be said of
one that is either better or worse than the other nor, importantly, that it is
of equal value to another so that "reason has no judgment to make
concerning their relative value[s]." 8 There is no general procedure for
resolving conflicts amongst incommensurable values.
The resolution of such conflict would require the possibility of
comparison, which in turn requires the existence of a common currency
of value into which all primary values could be translated according to
fixed formulae, so that in cases of conflict it could be established, at least
theoretically, that the loss of so many units of value X in return for a gain
in so many units of Y, would result in a net gain or loss of (overall) value
compared to any of the alternative combinations of those two values.
For Berlin, the incommensurability of values prevents precisely this
translation of different values into one common denomination. The idea
of an ultimate solution, therefore, in which values are combined in a
quasi-Pareto optimal way, so that there would be no other combination of
values that would create more value, is not only unattainable in practice,
but also conceptually incoherent.
Value pluralism poses a threat to modern conceptions of human
rights at two levels: first, at the philosophical level where it challenges
the possibility of a prioritisation of any particular set of human values
over other values; and second, at the level of adjudication between
particular rights that have been prioritised in human rights documents as
a result of political rather than philosophical choices and which also
involve conflicts between pluralistic values. The remainder of this
Section will focus on the first issue, whilst the subsequent Section will
deal with the latter. Both are interlinked.
Berlin gives many examples of conflicting values. Liberty can
conflict with equality or public order; mercy with justice; love with
impartiality and fairness; social and moral commitment with the
disinterested pursuit of art as the commitment to either truth or beauty
(indeed the latter two values, contrary to Keats, may themselves be
incompatible); and intellectual freedom with both happiness and justice. 9
Moreover, Berlin argues that most conflicting values are internally
7. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 50 (London 1995) (citing Joseph Raz, infra note
8, at 325).
8. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322-24 (Oxford 1986).
9. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 45.
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complex and pluralistic, containing conflicting elements. An example is
the concept of liberty, which divides into both positive and negative
liberty.' 0 Moreover, the concept of negative liberty itself, defined as the
freedom to act independently of external restraints, contains rivalrous
and incommensurable liberties. For example, the liberty of the press to
probe into peoples' private lives may limit the latter's freedom to do
what they like without fear of disapprobation or intrusion. The same is
true of equality, which may be construed in terms of the
incommensurable equalities of income and opportunity, or of welfare and
resources.1" Individual values are not harmonious wholes, but within
themselves constitute arenas of conflict and incommensurability. 2
In a value pluriverse the legal priority accorded to human rights
over other goods can only be defended rationally if these rights relate to
those fundamental pluralistic values between which there is no
possibility of rational choice, but which nonetheless enjoy priority over
other goods either on the grounds that the latter are merely instrumental
or inferior. Human rights, therefore, must either be rights to promote
pluralistic values or rights to those conditions that allow for their
furtherance. Thus, for instance, for both Rawls and Nozick the priority
of the right over the good is ultimately grounded in a belief (albeit to
different degrees) that the value of negative liberty trumps that of all
other rivalrous values. Put differently, all this means is that unless rights
further or safeguard values that are more important than others, it seems
unjustified to give them priority. To give priority to something, for
instance by making it legally enforceable when other values are not, must
mean that it is in some sense more valuable unless external enforcement
is somehow antithetical to the achievement of a good. Subject to this
qualification, the idea of protecting lesser as opposed to more
fundamental values seems irrational.
Yet, in an ethical pluriverse where any choice between fundamental
values entails loss and no choice is necessarily rationally preferable. The
same applies to instances of choice between the rights derived from
them, whether they are defined as enabling conditions for these values or
10. Negative liberty, put simply, consists in the absence of external impediments,
whilst positive liberty equates freedom with doing what is rational or moral. On the
negative view, a person is free if others do not prevent him from experimenting with
drugs and becoming addicted. In such a state, however, the agent would not be free in
the positive sense. For the classic exposition of the distinction between negative and
positive liberty, see Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF
MANKIND 191 (H. Hardy & R. Hausheer eds., London 1997).
11. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. &
PuB. AFF. 185, 185-246 (1981); see also Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part II:
Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 283-345 (1981).
12. GRAY, supra note 7, at 43.
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as identical with fundamental values. Obvious examples are the
following: equality, whether equated with equality of welfare, income or
opportunity, would sanction economic or social rights, such as a right to
a just wage independent of the market price, that these choices would be
just as incompatible with the freedoms of intellectual enquiry and artistic
expression, as with the economic freedoms sanctioned by the demands of
efficiency or innovation. These sets of rights each express some ultimate
value or a fundamental corollary, such as justice, knowledge, aesthetic
self-expression, and wealth maximisation. Yet they are both
incompatible and incommensurable, and their incommensurability means
that it is impossible to say how much of each right would prove to be the
best for society, or indeed which are the values such a society would seek
to protect as human rights and which it would leave legally
unenforceable. If there is no rational basis for choice between the
underlying values, then there is no such basis for prioritising one set of
rights (e.g., the negative liberties of intellectual and economic freedom as
the legal guarantees favouring the values of scientific advancement or
economic efficiency) over an alternative set (e.g., the economic and
social rights implied by social justice, equality or the satisfaction of basic
needs). Choosing the former favours one set of value, choosing the latter
favours the other, but since there is no rational way of establishing the
priority of either underlying values, there is no rational basis for
prioritising one set of rights over another.
In general terms, therefore, if fundamental values can be
incompatible and are incommensurable, then the same will be true of
rights. Consequently, if the rights conflict, as they often will, it is
impossible to say by reference to a common standard of value when, for
example, a restriction in certain liberties, such as the freedom to provide
private sector education or healthcare, may be justified by correlative
gains in equality resulting from prioritising rights to universal public
education and free healthcare. In short, if we take value pluralism
seriously, then, if no value always takes priority over others, neither can
any right or set of rights. When pluralistic rights conflict, there is no
rational way of prioritising one over another, either generally or often
even in particular conflicting situations.
It is common for human rights to be divided into three generations
of rights. The first generation are civil and political rights, second
generation rights refer to social and economic rights, and third generation
rights are commonly understood to connote miscellaneous collective
rights, such as minority rights, environmental or other group rights.
13
13. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 136-320 (Clarendon Press 1996).
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Focusing on the first two categories, which remain the most influential,
there is an undeniable conflict between civil and political rights on the
one hand and social and economic rights on the other. This evidences
social and economic rights on the other an expression of the underlying
tension between the pluralistic values of individual liberty and social
justice or equality. To the extent to which any bill of rights favours one
or the other, it is based on a value judgment for which there is no rational
basis. And to the extent to which it may include both first and second
generation rights and seeks to compromise between them, any such
compromise it may strike is likewise incapable of rational justification.
The reason lies in the lack of transitivity between rights grounded in
pluralistic values, which precludes their optimisation.
The ECHR is a prime example of a classic human rights instrument
confined largely to first generation rights, which can be divided into
several broad sub-categories: first, rights protecting personal integrity
(Articles 2 to 4); second, rights of due process or legality (Articles 5 to 7
and Article 13); third, the freedoms of speech, conscience and religion,
which are at once civil rights and also safeguard individual autonomy
(Articles 9 to 11); and finally, the right to private and family life (Article
8) and the bizarre right to found a family (Article 12). Social and
economic rights are practically absent from the Convention, as the right
to non-discrimination (Article 14) does not refer to a general right to
substantive equality, but is confined to equal enjoyment of the other
Convention rights. Notwithstanding the rights protected by Articles 2
through 4, safeguarding the minimal conditions of unimpeded agency,
the Convention unequivocally favours civil and political rights over
social and economic rights even to the point where it comes close to
treating children as the private property of their parents by granting the
latter the Article 12 right to procreate, even if they do not have the means
to a basic standard of living. From the perspective of value pluralism,
the privileged legal status assigned to these liberties but denied to the
values of social justice or minimum needs, lacks a rational basis. Unless
one is prepared to endorse the premises that negative liberty generally
trumps positive liberty and that the primacy of individual liberty over all
other values including economic and social rights may be legitimately
limited only to protect the minimum social and psychological conditions
of individual agency, the primacy assigned to civil and political rights is
morally arbitrary.
III. Value Pluralism and Human Rights Adjudication
It might be objected that whilst value pluralism may pose a threat to
providing a philosophical foundation for prioritising specific human
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rights, it is practically irrelevant as some values have de facto triumphed
over others in the sense that they have found political and legal
recognition in human rights documents, while others have not. A
distinction should therefore be drawn between two types of inquiry: the
search for a philosophical foundation for rights on the one hand, and on
the other, the more limited attempt to bring coherence into human rights
language at the level of judicial practice and political reality. Where
legally enshrined rights clash, the conflicts between them do not have to
be settled at the deep philosophical level of their underlying
justifications, but are confined to the more tangible level of the wording
of charter provisions and legal principles.
This view is mistaken for three reasons. First, value pluralism
remains a pervasive problem of human rights adjudication. Second, the
concept of human rights itself is an essentially contestable concept.
Third, many human rights either represent or contain such concepts, as
do the limiting conditions defining the scope of rights no less than the
legal principles supposed to constrain judicial discretion in balancing
conflicting rights. The first reason is outlined in this Section; Section
Four addresses the second and third reasons as part of the wider
discussion of essentially contested concepts.
Not only do some modem constitutions, such as the German
Constitution 14 expressly mention certain basic values such as human
dignity which underlie other constitutional rights, but as Conor Gearty,
15
David Feldman 16 and others have shown, human rights documents
generally contain rights that are clustered around a range of core values,
even if these values are not expressly mentioned. These core values tend
to be human dignity, including the right to life, procedural justice (or the
rule of law), and the ideal of democratic government. Gearty mentions
these three values, but some values in the ECHR and other bills of rights
do not appear to be justifiable on these grounds. These include the rights
to marry, to found a family and to privacy. 17 A fourth core value may
therefore be added, which is individual or negative liberty. Together
these four values provide a justification for almost all the human rights
contained in any national or international charter; although, one might
14. Grundgesetz ftir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (F.R.G.) (promulgated by the
Parliamentary Council on May 23, 1949) (as amended by the Unification Treaty of Aug.
31, 1990 and Federal Statute of Sept. 23, 1990), available at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/
docs/german.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2007).
15. CONOR GEARTY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (Oxford 2004);
see also, CONOR GEARTY, CAN HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? 17-59 (Cambridge U. Press
2006).
16. DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS tN ENGLAND AND WALES
1, 51 (2d ed. 2002).
17. See id. at 518, 524 & 527.
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also wish to add equality as a supplementary value--equality not in any
substantive sense but as the principle of non-discrimination or equal
enjoyment of fundamental rights.18  Bills of rights and human rights
conventions either expressly affirm these values or, where they do not,
the courts nonetheless often invoke and refer to them as underlying
values or justificatory grounds for specific rights.
The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1948), for
example, expressly affirms the "dignity and worth of the human person"
and "the equal rights of men and women" as "the foundation of
freedom."19 In the Preamble to the ECHR the signatory states refer to
"fundamental freedoms," which "are best maintained.., by an effective
political democracy. 2°  National constitutions also expressly affirm
several core values in their definition of particular rights. The German or
South African constitutions, for example, both mention "human dignity"
together with other core values. There has clearly been an international
convergence in terms both of the content and underlying principles of
human rights instruments.21 Value pluralism has not disappeared at the
practical level of human rights instruments. It has simply been reduced
to the plurality of four to five ultimate core values, which, depending on
the circumstances, may be harmonious, indifferent to, or in conflict with
each other.
Where rights based on core values conflict, the rivalrous rights will
either express different values or different aspects of the same value. For
example, the potentially conflicting demands between freedom of
18. Another common way of classifying fundamental rights is the distinction
between civil liberties and human rights. Broadly speaking, civil liberties are those
which individuals enjoy by virtue of being citizens of a society, while human rights
properly refer to those rights derived from the principles of dignity and individual liberty.
Freedom of association seems clearly a civil liberty, while the rights to life or the
prohibition of torture are examples of rights based on human dignity. Some rights,
however, can be classified as falling into either category, e.g., freedom of expression and
privacy may be defended as grounded in human dignity on a liberal view of society, but
may also be conceived as possessing little intrinsic value because it does little more than
afford people the opportunity to do in private what they may not wish to admit to in
public. It also remains unclear if political rights, such as the rights to vote or stand for
office form a separate category or further examples of civil liberties. In general terms,
not much hinges on such qualifications; although, they are useful in drawing attention to
the underlying justificatory ideas of human rights.
19. U.N. Charter pmbl. (1948).
20. European Convention on Human Rights pmbl. (1950), available at
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2007).
21. Feldman provides a number of specific illustrations. The French Conseil
Constitutionnel, for example, has repeatedly treated human dignity as a fundamental
constitutional principle, although it is not expressly mentioned in either the French
Declaration of Human Rights or the French Constitution. Feldman shows that the same
could even be said of the English Court of Appeal which has not shrunk from relying on
the notion of human dignity in all but name. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 125-32.
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expression and the right to privacy, which may be presented as a
straightforward clash between the requirements of the core values of
democracy and individual liberty. Alternatively, these conflicting
aspects of the rights can be viewed as a conflict between two different
aspects of negative liberty sub-divided into the two negative liberties of
the freedom of expression, as opposed to the liberty to conduct one's life
free from unwelcome publicity. Conflicts also exist between the
freedom of the press as a subset of freedom of expression, and the right
to a fair trial, which precludes undue influence on the jury, e.g., by a
virulent press campaign.22 Again, conflicts can be seen in the right to life
and the freedom of abortion which is often justified, somewhat debatably
in terms of ordinary usage of language, as a derivative of the right to
privacy. The rights to liberty, privacy or fair trial are perpetually in
conflict with the exigencies of public security and emergency. In all
these cases the tensions between these rights are expressive of an
underlying clash between competing values, or conflicting aspects within
a single value.
Conflict of this kind can only be resolved by appeal to reason if
there is a clear hierarchy between the underlying values or the different
aspects of them, so that the rights derived from them can themselves be
ranked. Dworkin must have had such a balancing exercise in mind when
developing his "one right answer" adjudication thesis. Yet, neither in
Law's Empire23 nor in Taking Rights Seriously,24 in which he outlines his
interpretative theory of justice and his "one right answer" thesis in favour
of objectivity in legal judgments, does Dworkin spell out any criterion or
formula according to which the right answers are to be found where two
legal propositions support opposite conclusions or in cases where there is
a "tie" between conflicting rights or legal rules generally.25 Ultimately,
of course, Dworkin merely refers to a wider social consensus supporting
the "right to equal concern and respect" as the basis for resolving such
ties.26 Other strategies for ranking competing rights on a rational basis
22. See e.g., Wioch v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 30, 2000); Priebke v. Italy,
48799/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 5, 2001).
23. RONALD DWORKN, LAW'S EMPIRE (Belknap Press 1986).
24. RONALD DwORK1N, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. Press 1977).
25. For an excellent discussion of the problems with Dworkin's objectivity claim for
legal judgment, see STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN ch. 6 (Stanford U. Press 1991).
For the apparent contradiction between his "one right answer" thesis and his distinction
between absolute and less than absolute rights, see id. at 66-68. Absolute rights,
according to Dworkin, withstand no competition. It follows that if there are several of
them then, where they conflict, there is no way of avoiding absolute, incommensurable
loss.
26. See Ronald Dworkin, Do Liberal Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH
BERLIN 73 (Ronald Dworkin, Mark Lilla, & R.B. Silvers eds., 2001); see also Guest,
supra note 25, at 243-48.
20081
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
include the ulititarian calculus; welfare maximisation in the "law and
economics" movement; Rawls' overlapping consensus as the source of
the principles of justice, and the metaphysical claims of theories of
human flourishing underlying natural law thinking as found for instance
in Finnis.27 Where balancing exercises between rights are conducted on
consequentialist grounds, the very appeal to consequences is evidently
contentious because rights by their nature are designed to trump
consequentialist, utilitarian, or majoritarian considerations. In other
cases where the appeal is to supreme moral principles of one kind or
another as grounded in liberal consensus, such as in Dworkin or Rawls,
or to an anthropologically enriched conception of human flourishing as
in Finnis, these strategies ultimately rest on a monistic assumption which
asserts the priority of one value over all others. Consequentialism, once
combined with a particular end, likewise is a variant of monism.
2 8
Conflicts between values that are genuinely pluralistic cannot be
resolved philosophically, as they occur between the competing demands
of equally ultimate values or different aspects of equal or indeterminate
rank within single values. It follows that when rights are justified in
these terms, they too are equal or indeterminate. When they come into
conflict and judges have to adjudicate between their conflicting claims,
there is no rational basis for favouring one over the other or one
compromise solution over another. When a judicial choice is made in
such circumstances, it is made in the absence of rational justification and
"beyond good and evil."29
27. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
28. At a practical level, Sunstein suggests, conflicts between competing rights and
other legal rules are regularly resolved by agreement of "low level" incompletely
reasoned arguments that avoid issues concerning the broader principles behind them. For
instance, most people might agree that discrimination based on sexual preference is
wrong without a corresponding agreement as to the underlying broader principle behind
that agreement. "Incompletely theorized arguments" produce agreement on particular
outcomes without taking sides on social controversies. Sunstein even suggests that they
enhance the legitimacy of the courts by allowing them to avoid identifying themselves
with divisive issues of general principle which remain unresolved. See generally C.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (Oxford 1996). Sunstein's
analysis astutely demonstrates how judges provide socially acceptable judicial outcomes
on issues characterised by wider ethical disagreements in society essentially by
obfuscating the basic justificatory questions involved. By avoiding tackling the
underlying incommensurables, however, this approach trivialises the idea of human rights
and destroys its moral force. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 220
(Oxford 1996).
29. It is obvious that it does not follow from these or any of the above remarks that
one judicial decision will always be as good as another. Only those judicial decisions
which concern choices between equally ultimate, incompatible and incommensurable
values are not capable of rational or ethical justification, and then only by comparison to
other such decisions. There will always remain numerous judicial decisions that could be
described as rational or ethically sub-optimal in the sense that they reconcile values x and
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The persistence of value pluralism at the level of human rights
adjudication poses a threat to the distinction between law making and
application of the law, which is at the heart of the notion of the rule of
law. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it is not commonly
acknowledged that the human rights jurisdiction of the courts is ill-
defined, or that judges routinely engage in value judgments when
balancing conflicting cardinal values behind the veil of legal objectivity
and value-neutral human rights adjudication. Three propositions in
particular may be advanced in support of the view that human rights
instruments can be drafted and interpreted in ways capable of resolving
rights conflicts without making monistic assumptions.
First, it may be argued that where human rights are constitutionally
recognised, the question of their justification has been given a definitive
politico-legal answer. Thus, conflicts between them can be resolved by
reference to established legal principles, which tell judges which right
takes priority under what circumstances. Some legal theorists, notably
Dworkin, even seem to suggest that all legal questions, including all
questions involving conflicts between rights, have one correct legal
answer, and that where strict legal rules run out, that answer is always
provided by the appropriate legal principles.3 °
Second, human rights instruments are generally worded so as to
provide for appropriate exceptions and qualifications, which reduce the
scope for judicial discretion in balancing rivalrous rights or the
conflicting demands of rights and public goods.
3 1
y in a way that a greater amount could be realised of either value by an alternative
decision without any detriment to the other value. It is difficult, however, to establish
that one judicial decision will contain all the benefits in terms of protecting one right also
offered by an alternative decision plus sacrifice less of the conflicting right than the
alternative. In such a case it could be argued that one judicial decision realised more
value than another and is therefore preferable because the outcomes are not
incommensurable. More typically, however, two alternative decisions will balance rights
in ways that do not clearly allow for such comparative assessments, which means that the
results will be incommensurable provided both claims fall properly within the remit of
the two or more conflicting rights identified. Whether they do, however, is not an issue
resulting from the ethical indeterminacies of value pluralism but a question of conceptual
certainty which is the subject of the next section of this Article.
30. See DWORKIN, supra note 24.
31. There are numerous examples. An obvious one is the protection of private
property in the ECHR or the German Basic Law, which is qualified with reference to the
public interest. Another and perhaps more surprising instance of a heavily qualified right
is the right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR, which for a long time was deemed
compatible with the death penalty and remains so for those countries that have not signed
the protocol abolishing the latter, and is subject to a whole array of other exceptions
concerned with public security and the enforcement of the criminal law. In fact, Article 2
is one of the most heavily qualified rights of the ECHR, in contrast for example with the
unqualified prohibition of torture and degrading treatment under Article 3. See European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 20.
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Third, the possibility of clashes between rights is reduced even
further in practice, because bills of rights generally either exclude or only
partially safeguard positive rights, such as those rights requiring state
action beyond legal prohibitions to enable individuals to achieve certain
ends. Nor do bills of rights generally endorse positive corollaries of
negative rights.
If true, these three propositions would warrant the conclusion that
"hard cases" resulting from pluralistic value conflicts have no or little
practical significance, because conflicts between them can be settled by
judges without recourse to foundationalist reasoning.
Unfortunately, however, these attempts to consign pluralism to the
outer reaches of metaphysics are unconvincing. The discussion in the
remainder of this Article indirectly refutes each of these claims by
considering the linguistic sources of uncertainty in human rights
adjudication. Conceptual uncertainty, in addition to value conflict, exists
in at least four respects: regarding the essential contestability of the
(1) concept of human rights, (2) concepts underlying many individual
rights, (3) concepts defining the limitations and qualifications commonly
imposed on human rights, and (4) legal principles designed to govern the
application of rights and balance their conflicting requirements. Before
dealing with these individually, however, it is necessary to briefly outline
the notion of essentially contested concepts.
IV. The Idea of Essentially Contested Concepts
In a well-known article, the philosopher W.B. Gallie argued there
are concepts that are essentially contested concepts ("ECC"), which
inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of
their user. For Gallie, a concept is essentially contestable if it is
impossible by means of rational-logical argument to resolve
disagreements about its meaning, and that whatever meaning is attached
to it is contingent on substantive normative assumptions. He lists seven
conditions a concept must fulfil to be essentially contested. Some of
these partially restate one another, others are unclear and some are
disputed by commentators.32 I shall focus on the first three essential
ones, and later add a fourth condition:
(1) The concept must be evaluative or "appraisive;" it must signify
something that is valuable, good, right, worthy and so on;
(2) The nature of the concept must be complex, so that different
32. See John Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J. OF
POL. Sci. 385, 390 (1978).
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aspects of it can be stressed;
(3) It is not manifest why the achievement of the condition signified
by the complex concept is good, right, worthy and so on; its goodness
or rightness can be explained in different ways, depending on which
aspect of the complex one focuses on.
On this basis a concept is essentially contested when it is appraisive, in
that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement that is
variously describable and internally complex because its characterisation
involves reference to several aspects or dimensions without any criteria
of application which determine the order and weight of these multiple
aspects or dimensions.33
Gallie explains his idea of an essentially contested concept through
the example of championship.34 In contrast with familiar annual
competitions where the rules for the selection of "the champion" are
clear, Gallie suggests the following unusual scenario: the championship
is not awarded according to some agreed-upon body of rules, but rather
in virtue of the style and level of play. Everyone agrees, though, that the
champion is the team that "plays the best." There is no fixed point at
which a team becomes the champion, nor does it retain the title for a
fixed period. The competition has no official judges, and there are no
settled, generally accepted rules for the designation of the champion.
Each side has its supporters who insist that it is the "true" or "real"
champion on the grounds that it "plays the game best." Each team
stresses some aspect of the game-speed, power, elegance, or strategy-
and is supported by its own groups of faithful, who insist that this is the
truly crucial aspect of the game. So each side sees its team as the best
because it expresses the part of the game that, they claim, is the most
important. Gallie's point, of course, is that such a competition would be
characterised by constant, intractable disputes about who is the
champion, because it is impossible to show what aspect of the game is
truly the most important and which team is truly the champion. In this
sense, the championship is essentially contested.
One way to understand Gallie's point is to distinguish between a
concept and various conceptions of it. Each of the competing
interpretations of the concept is a conception of it. Each conception has
at least some of the characteristics associated with the core-the concept.
To show that the various conceptions really represent disagreement about
33. The definition is the author's but it partly draws on that provided by William
Connolly in WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DiSCOURSE 9-14 (Princeton
Paperbacks 1974).
34. Gallie, supra note 33.
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a common concept and not different concepts themselves, Gallie adds a
further condition, namely, that the parties agree on a common
"exemplar"-a sort of perfect case-that embodies all the important
features of the concept.35 This appears mistaken.
There need not be a common core which is shared by all the uses of
a concept. A better analogy is that of Wittgenstein's idea of family
resemblances: a conception identifies some parts of the cluster as
features commonly found in conceptions of the concept. Not all the
cluster features, however, must be present in all conceptions of the
concept.36  The Hapsburg lip is an example of such a family
resemblance: while not present in every family member, it was a
recurring and common feature amongst the Hapsburgs in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.
The idea of concepts that are essentially contestable is conceptually
distinct from that of value pluralism; although, many values are also
essentially contested concepts. An example is the ECC of liberty-two
of its conceptions, those of negative freedom and positive freedom, may
also be conceived as pluralistic values in their own right. It is, therefore,
not surprising that in their effect value pluralism and the essential
contestability of concepts often reinforce each other.
A. The Essential Contestability of the Concept of Human Rights
It is common for political and legal theorists to distinguish between
the good and the right. A good, put simply, is either a value or a
desideratum that may be ultimate or instrumental. A right is a good that
takes priority over other goods in that it is given a special legal status.
The range of human goods is famously contested, as is the issue of the
possibility of the summum bonum, or the supreme good. Examples of
many goods that are ECCS, include justice, liberty, equality, dignity and
even happiness and political goods, such as liberalism or democracy.
Moreover, the concept of human rights is itself essentially
contestable, as it clearly connotes something valuable and is internally
complex in that its meaning represents a cluster of different aspects or
attributes, not all of which are compatible and/or subject to any accepted
hierarchical order or criteria of application. In large measure the
conceptual uncertainty of the idea of human rights merely reflects
competing theories of the nature of rights. One important distinction is
that between the will and interest theories of rights.
The will theory, propagated amongst others by H.L.A. Hart,37
35. Id. at 180.
36. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66 - § 71 (1972).
37. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955); see also
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identifies the right-bearer by virtue of the power that he has over any
corresponding duty. He can waive it, extinguish it, enforce it or leave it
unenforced; the decision is his. Individual discretion is the distinctive
feature of this concept of rights. Rights of this view may, therefore, also
be called liberties. By contrast, the interest theory, which is espoused by,
amongst others, Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz,38 argues that the
purpose of rights is not to protect individual assertion but certain
interests. The interest theory enables one to talk of rights in advance of
determining exactly who has the duty. It may therefore cover all types of
rights including so-called socio-economic rights, such as those to health
care, education or a minimum income.
The important point is that the concept of rights is used
ambiguously. On the will view, rights are waivable, while on the interest
view, they are not. The former simply assumes that the rights-bearer is
an autonomous agent, while the latter can accommodate paternalism to
protect those who may not be relied upon by acting in their own best
self-interest. Finally, while the latter conceives of rights as promoting
the good, the former views them as merely removing various obstacles to
individual liberty.
Other attributes, however, are shared by both views of rights: they
are individualistic, equal, and universal or universalisable; they also may
be negative or positive, or procedural or substantive. But even these
attributes shared by both theories are contested. Human rights
documents generally show a bias towards negative rights. According to
some views, human rights should be purely procedural. Furthermore,
third generation rights, such as minority or environmental rights,
conceive of rights as not necessarily universal, equal, and individualistic.
Rather, these rights are linked to the properties of certain groups or
persons, even those not yet alive and who may never be born. There is
no settled criterion for deciding which of these attributes are essential,
more important, or correct, because there is no universally shared or
demonstrably correct definition of the concept of human rights in terms
of its range of necessary and optional attributes. In that sense, the
concept of human rights can be said to be essentially contestable.
In practice, the indeterminacy of the concept of rights can be
overcome partly by a general judicial approach favouring the negative
construction over the positive construction of human rights. Yet, judicial
attitudes are far from consistent. In particular, both the Strasbourg and
the British judiciary have shown great willingness to impose positive
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM ch. VII (Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
38. See M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 355 (7th ed.
2001).
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obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR which protects the right to
39privacy.
In Hannover v. Germany,4° the Eur. Ct. H.R. held that the German
courts had failed in their positive duty to protect the applicant's right to
private life by adopting too narrow a conception of privacy in public
places. This "Hanoverian" approach by the Eur. Ct. H.R. has been taken
to extremes by the English courts under the Human Rights Act of 199841
("HRA"), which has made the Convention directly enforceable in the
domestic British courts, but also generally restricts litigation of ECHR
rights to cases against public authorities. In Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.,4 2 two
actors entered into an exclusive publication deal with a magazine,
effectively converting photographs of their wedding from essentially
private material into publicly available commercial material.43 The
Court of Appeal and House of Lords upheld an earlier finding of a
breach of the claimants' right to privacy when another national magazine
published unauthorised photographs, 4 thereby extending the concept of
privacy to include the right to the economic interest attached to waiving
that privacy.
The decision in Douglas is remarkable in two respects. First, it
implicitly asserts a will-based conception of privacy as an alienable right.
Second, what is astonishing in the Douglas case, as well as the House of
Lords ruling in Campbell v. MGN Ltd.,45 is the apparent ease with which
the courts use their powers as public authorities under Section 6 of
HRA46 to ensure compliance with the ECHR in horizontal litigation
involving private parties. 47 As these cases further indicate, this applies
when such litigation involves privacy claims by those whose economic
fortunes largely seem to rest on their celebrity status. In these cases, the
English courts have used their discretion to protect the indigenous law of
defamation and even consolidate the law of confidentiality over and
above the demands of freedom of expression, in spite of the expectation
that the incorporation of the latter ECHR right into English law might
have been expected to have exactly the opposite effect.
39. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Eur. T.S. No. 005 (Nov. 4, 1950).
40. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2005).
41. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
42. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, [2006] Q.B. 125.
43. See id.
44. See id.; OBG Ltd. v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, [2007] 2 W.L.R. 920.
45. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 All E.R. 995.
46. Human Rights Act § 6.
47. For the court's power under HRA § 6 in relation to the law of confidence, see A
v. B Plc [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337, 2003] Q.B. 195.
[Vol. 26:3
LEGITIMATION CRISIS, REIFYING HUMAN RIGHTS
The Eur. Ct. H.R. has also used Article 8 of the ECHR 48 to establish
positive obligations to recognise the rights of transsexuals. In I v. United
Kingdom49 and Goodwin v. United Kingdom,50 the court found a breach
of Article 8 where the state had not legally recognised a sex change,
noting in particular that the surgery had been provided by the state. The
court's expansive approach under Article 8 can be contrasted with its
generally restrictive approach to imposing positive obligations under
other ECHR articles. For example, and except in highly restricted
circumstances, the court has repeatedly rejected claims that failure to
grant legal aid where applicants had no other realistic means of funding
litigation amounted to a breach of the right to access to a court under
Article 6 of the ECHR.51
The court's asymmetrical approach to the acceptance of positive
dimensions of negative rights is exemplified by its steadfast avoidance of
delivering a definitive ruling on the issue of abortion, which it generally
prefers to be determined by domestic law. The Irish Constitution grants
a right to life to the unborn child subject to the equal right of the
mother.52 Although this clarifies, or at least attempts to delineate the
exceptional nature of the circumstances in which an abortion might be
permissible under Irish law, the Eur. Ct. H.R. nonetheless held that
Ireland's censoring of information about abortion services in far wider
circumstances violated the right to freedom of information and ideas
under Article 10 of the ECHR.53 The court's refusal to give a definitive
ruling on the issue of abortion might be justifiable under the ECHR's
margin of appreciation, but its ruling against the Irish government on this
occasion is clearly unconvincing because it appears to deny the Irish
government at least some of the means of enforcing its own legitimate
public policy goals, an interest expressly recognised as appropriate under
Article 10.
54
Ultimately, Open Door is merely an illustration of the disparate
48. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 39.
49. I v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 53 (2003).
50. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28975/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2002).
51. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 39, at art. 6. The Court's reluctance to impose a public duty to
fund civil litigation can be explained in terms of the general judicial reluctance to pass
judgments with far-reaching budgetary implications. Yet, this does not detract from the
fact that the courts seem to hover between negative and positive interpretations of rights
almost at will, sometimes, admittedly influenced by expediency.
52. See IR. CONST., 1937, amend. VIII.
53. See Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Ctr. v. Ireland, App.
Nos. 14234/88, 14235/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 115, 131 (1992).
54. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 39, at art. 10.
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treatment by the Eur. Ct. H.R. of the rights to privacy and freedom of
expression under Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR, respectively. Although
the court has held that lack of impartiality in reporting in public
broadcasting or television channels may be in breach of Article 10 of the
ECHR,55 it has consistently refused to extend that reasoning to impose a
positive regulatory duty on public bodies to protect plurality of political
opinion in the press and media against a growing concentration of media
power in private hands. This approach is unconvincing: if freedom of
expression is one of the pillars of the political culture and debate
underpinning an effectively functioning liberal democracy, then there is
an equal justification for media regulation to prevent concentration with
its attendant danger of abuse of media power and individual debasement
as there is to oversee government interference with public broadcasting
and to protect journalistic freedom. The court's steadfast reluctance to
establish a regulatory duty on the basis of Article 10 has been in stark
contrast to its more expansive approach to Article 8 of the ECHR.
In sum, to the extent to which legal instruments may be said
generally to favour negative over positive rights, they have patently
failed to restrain the courts from extending positive duties to some rights
but not others. There are two principal reasons for the persistence of
broad judicial discretion in this regard. First, in the absence of shared
agreement on a fixed set of core attributes definitive of human rights,
there is no means to demonstrate the validity of one conception of the
term "human right" over another. In other words, conceptual
indeterminacy favours judicial discretion. Second, judicial discretion is
amplified by the basic observation that, in the absence of clear
definitions of particular rights and their scope, those normative reasons
justifying non-interference with a particular right will often also justify
additional positive measures to further those rights. Although conceptual
indeterminacy of the idea of human rights allows the courts to determine
when to interpret rights negatively or more positively, the irreducibility
to negative or positive interpretations of many arguments justifying
individual rights ensures that, regardless of which interpretation the
courts may favour initially, remain at liberty either to expand their
interpretation of individual rights with reference to the same reasons that
existed for recognising the right in the first place or narrow their initial
interpretation with reference to the equally elastic moral reasons
supporting conflicting rights or legitimate public policy goals. Courts, it
seems, are free to impose positive duties with respect to some rights
while denying them to others. In this way, courts are free from the need
55. See EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN 102 (Dirk Ehlers &
Wlater de Gruyter eds., 2d ed., Berlin 2005).
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for consistency or even its underdeveloped twin-reasoning by
analogy-and are subject only to the one condition on which all judicial
discretion ultimately depends: sufficient political sensitivity not to
challenge a popular government over an issue of fundamental public
interest where the courts would be disconnected from the public mood.
B. The Essential Contestability of the Concepts Underlying Human
Rights
Charters of rights are not neutral; rather, they privilege some claims
over others; generally elevate individual autonomy and liberty over
competing values, such as social justice; and privilege the political ideal
of liberal representative democracy over other political values. The
ECHR, like most international covenants and domestic bills of rights, is a
prime example of a human rights document with a pronounced liberal,
individualistic bias. It has been demonstrated that the political settlement
favouring these values among the wider range of pluralistic goods cannot
overcome the pluralistic dilemma of incommensurability between
conflicting values. It also has been shown that the concept of human
rights, which legally elevates some of those values or aspects thereof
over others, is essentially contestable: disagreements about its meaning
between rival conceptions of it cannot be settled by rational or logical
argument.
Not only is the concept of human rights essentially contestable, but
so are many of its constituent concepts of individual rights and the basic
values underlying the most widely recognised human rights. This creates
a dual source of vagueness and uncertainty in judicial interpretations of
individual rights. The dual effect arising from conceptual contestability
is best illustrated by reference to the concepts concerned.
First, among the rights in the ECHR and most other human rights
documents, the right to life and the prohibitions of torture, slavery, and
arbitrary arrest are based on a certain ideal of individual dignity. While
the core meaning of concepts, such as life and torture, may be clear, there
will, however, always be a penumbra of uncertainty in marginal cases.
56
In penumbral cases, judges seek to justify their decisions by reference to
the values underlying individual rights. Individual dignity is one such
value. It is, however, also an essentially contestable concept. The
56. The metaphor of the core and penumbra was popularised by H.L.A Hart. See
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119 (1st ed. 1961) ("Nothing can eliminate this
duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt when we are engaged in bringing
particular situations under general rules."). Glanville Williams, however, presaged Hart's
claim that the judge has a law-making role in penumbral cases. See Glanville L.
Williams, Language and the Law-Ill, 61 L. Q. REV. 293, 302-03 (1945).
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concept of dignity cannot furnish practical ethical, political, or legal
prescriptions, except in the context of a particular model of human nature
and its ends. The aspect or aspects of the multifarious concept of dignity
emphasised at the expense of others inevitably will depend on which
model of human nature is adopted, determining the nature and scope of
the rights that can be grounded in dignity. Although dignity generally is
readily granted to all human beings in possession of the ordinary human
faculties-including, with qualifications, children-the concept becomes
contestable at both the dawn and the end of human life. Birth, in
particular, seems to make all the difference, and a protracted and ongoing
judicial battle has been fought in most jurisdictions over the issue of
whether-and, if so, to what extent-a human fetus enjoys a right to life.
The answer invariably reflects conflicting visions of what it means to
have human personality and the requisite attributes to acquire the
indefeasible quality of human dignity. The existence of such
disagreements is an expression not only of conflicting values, but also of
the vagueness and contestability of the concept of dignity.
A second set of ECHR rights includes the civil freedoms of
association, religion, and expression; 57 the rights to private and family
life;58 and the sui generis right to found a family.59 All of these rights
revolve around the ideals of individual autonomy or liberty. Liberty, of
course, in its two equally compelling but conflicting variants of positive
and negative liberty, is an archetypal ECC. For example, a drug addict is
free in the negative sense-if nobody prevents him-to administer his
drug dose, but that does not make him free in the positive sense not to
take the drug. Autonomy is essentially open to contestability for the
same reason: it can be equated with rational self-government or merely
with consent. Rational self-government assumes that there is a
demonstrably rational stance and a person is autonomous only if he
embraces it. By contrast, consent is not concerned with rationality, but
solely with whether or not the agent has agreed to something.6° Common
to both is the concept of self-government; the two conceptions of
57. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 39, at arts. 9-11.
58. See id. at art. 8.
59. See id. at art. 12.
60. Consent can be deconstructed into conflicting conceptions. Consent is of
particular importance in medical cases where it forms the basis of the adult's right to
accept or refuse treatment. The question then arises whether consent needs to be fully
informed or merely expressed. However, the English courts have generally been
reluctant to extend human rights concepts to standards of medical care and instead, with
very little regard for consistency, have framed the relevant rules as an aspect of the law of
professional negligence rather than patients' rights. See Sidaway v. Bd. of Governors of
the Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] A.C. 871 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); R. v.
Richardson (Diane), [1999] Q.B. 444; R. v. Tabassum (Naveed), [2000] Crim. App. 328.
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autonomy differ in relation to the attributes the agent must possess.
Article 5 of the ECHR mentions a right to liberty, but that right is
confined, in general terms, to freedom from detention.61  Most cases
involving restrictions of individual liberty or autonomy have been
litigated under Article 8, which protects the right to privacy.62 Like the
concept of liberty, privacy lacks an agreed-upon set of necessary and
sufficient attributes. In Hannover v. Germany, the Eur. Ct. H.R. adopted
a broad conception of privacy encompassing intrusions into a person's
life that take place in public when such interference does not concern an
"issue of general interest." 63 In the English case of Howlett v. Terry
Holding,64 the English judge, obliged to recognise Strasbourg case law
and who purported to apply the broad privacy test laid down in the
Hannover case, nevertheless applied a simple test based on the
distinction between conduct in public and intrusions into conduct in the
private home. Leaving aside the misinterpretation of the Strasbourg
authority by the English judge, the important point in this context is that
each definition of the term "private"-its simple equation with the
private home and the broader "private sphere of action" approach of the
Eur. Ct. H.R.-captures distinct, conflicting, and yet equally valid
conceptions of the concept of privacy. This is a classic case of an ECC.
The emergence and persistence of multiple privacy tests reflects the
fact that the Eur. Ct. H.R. has deliberately avoided defining the concept
of privacy. This has expanded the application of the concept to include
many situations more appropriately described as involving the exercise
of individual liberty and also to extend privacy to the workplace and
even conduct in public where not of general interest.65 On a basic level,
however, the inconsistency and ambiguity in the court's jurisprudence
may be viewed as an expression of the conceptual indeterminacy
61. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 39, at art. 5.
62. See, e.g., supra notes 39, 48-50 and accompanying text.
63. See von Hannover v. Germany, supra note 40. In Hannover, the Eur. Ct. H.R.
reasoned that the German courts had erred in its decision that the ECHR right to privacy
only applied where the applicant found herself in a secluded place out of the public eye to
which persons retire "with the objectively recognisable aim of being alone and where,
confident of being alone, behaves in a manner in which he or she would not behave in
public." Id. 54. Rejecting the "recognisable aim of being alone" test, the Eur. Ct. H.R.
decided instead that the decisive factor in balancing the protection of private life against
freedom of expression was the contribution that the published photos and articles could
make to a debate of general interest. Id. 76. On the facts of the case, the court held that
the photos made no such contribution because the applicant did not exercise any official
function and the publication related solely to her private life. Id.
64. Howlett v. Holding, [2006] EWHC 41, Q.B. 41.
65. For more detailed discussion, see EUROPAIscHE GRUNDRECHTE UND
GRUNDFREIHEITEN, supra note 55, at 64-65.
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surrounding the concept of privacy. Privacy does not simply mean
secrecy or protection against surveillance by others, which would be of
little value if the individual, while being protected against publicity,
remained constrained and unable to do what he likes.66 The desirability
of privacy, therefore, presupposes individual liberty. Hence, privacy is
partly synonymous with self-determination,67 and it may be argued, that
Article 8 of the ECHR protects the individual's private sphere of self-
determination free from public scrutiny. This conception of privacy was
applied by the ECHR in Van Kiick68 where the court posited a right to
self-determination and extended it to issues related to sex change
surgery. It is not obvious, however, what, if anything, the issues of
public recognition and reimbursement of medical expenses for such a
surgery have to do with the right to privacy. Yet, the case is a good
example of how conceptual uncertainty arising from initial recognition of
the interconnectedness of two concepts-those of privacy and self-
determination, for example-can be used to extend rights into politically
fashionable but rationally and ethically questionable territory. Respect
for private life quickly ceases to be a mere matter of protecting people
from embarrassment by external scrutiny of their personal lives-the
natural meaning of the term "privacy"-and comes to involve both
respect for the individual's personality and social recognition-not part
of the obvious meaning of the term privacy, but part and parcel of the
judicial usage of the term, at least when it is expedient.
The catch-all use of the concept of privacy by the judiciary has been
particularly evident in the area of sexual freedom. In 1981, the Eur. Ct.
H.R. held in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom69 held that the blanket
criminalisation of homosexual acts violated the right to privacy of
homosexual men. That case concerned the law in Northern Ireland,
although the court reached the same conclusion in relation to analogous
bans in the Republic of Ireland70 and Cyprus. 71 Nowhere in Europe,
however, did the courts stretch the concept of privacy as systematically
and radically beyond its ordinary meaning as in the United States. In the
1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,72 the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute on the grounds that,
66. For example, Paul Chadwick, Victoria Privacy Commissioner in Australia,
argues that privacy serves three essential purposes: intimacy, liberty, and individuality.
Paul Chadwick, The Value of Privacy, 2006 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 495, 497 (2006).
67. See id.
68. Van Kuck v. Germany, App. No. 39568/97, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51 (2003).
69. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40 (1981).
70. See Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988).
71. See Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993).
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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by impinging on "an intimate relation of husband and wife, 7 3 the statute
violated "a right of privacy older than the Bill or Rights. 74 Two years
later, in Loving v. Virginia,75 the Court struck down Virginia's law
banning interracial marriages, also on the basis of the allegedly time-
honoured right to privacy that is not even part of the U.S. Constitution.
And in 1972, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,76 the Court struck down a state
statute confining distribution of contraceptive devices to married people.
According to Justice Brennan, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.,
77
The judicial stage was set for the Supreme Court's final extension of
privacy into the realm of sexual self-determination in Roe v. Wade.
78
Like the sea-encrusted statue of Glaucon which, ravaged by time, ceased
to bear any resemblance to its original, the legal meaning of the term
"privacy" no longer bears any meaningful relationship to the ordinary
meaning of the word.
It is remarkable that the Eur. Ct. H.R., like the U.S. Supreme Court
and the highest courts in Britain, Australia and other common law
jurisdictions, has generally taken privacy seriously to further sexual
freedom, but their attitude has been extremely restrictive when
scrutinising invasive government anti-terrorism measures; government
legislation allowing surveillance of internet browsing both on
professional and private personal computers; and the use of genetic and
other personal data including their transfer as part of international
agreements and for healthcare and other purposes. Likewise, the
widespread introduction of identification verification technology and
surveillance cameras has been largely ignored by the courts. Data
protection, which one reasonably may consider as the most sensitive and
important aspect of privacy, has met with little judicial interest. Instead,
the court has preferred to focus on the seemingly more pressing social
73. Id. at 482.
74. Id. at 486.
75. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
77. Id. at 453.
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The U.S. Supreme Court was an agent of
social change. It would be a mistake, however, to think the judicial activism was
confined to the federal judiciary. An extreme example of judicial defiance of linguistic
convention by a senior state court can be found in the case of M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). There the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey ruled that official recognition of a person's reassigned sex would "promote
the individual's quest for inner peace and personal happiness, while in no way disserving
any societal interest, principle of public order or precept of morality." Id. at 211.
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need to advance existing trends towards sexual freedom and fulfilment.79
Finally, there remain some ECHR rights which, broadly speaking,
derive their justification from the normative foundations of the rule of
law and democracy. These are the rights of procedural justice 80 and civil
freedoms 81 which, as forms of individual liberty, nevertheless are crucial
to a democratic political culture. Democracy is rarely questioned as a
political value but it is a complex concept and its different aspects have
requirements that do not necessarily pull in the same direction. The
following are all part of the cluster of attributes central to the concept of
democracy: majority rule, effective accountability by the governors to
the governed, a viable and vibrant political culture supported by a
recognisable demos (a people regarding itself as one), freedom of
expression, and, according to some, pluralism and tolerance. While the
basic core of the concept is clear, it is a matter of endless dispute which
of these, or which order of these, represents the proper conception of
democracy.
The courts generally try to avoid participation in defining notions of
democracy and, instead, prefer to defer to the executive where possible.
In reality, however, many judicial trade-offs between conflicting rights
involve judgments about the meaning, legitimate limits, and security
requirements of democratic government.82 The same can be said of
many other judicial decisions involving references to the "general
interest," the "public interest," or "public policy." For example, the
"debate of general interest" criterion adopted by the Eur. Ct. H.R. in the
Hannover case attempts to balance the conflicting demands of privacy
and freedom of expression.83 The court clearly assumed a restrained"
variant of democracy, which implies the controversial "private public
sphere" distinction the court has sought to establish without giving
adequate consideration to the creeping regulatory effect of restraints on
free speech.
79. See Chadwick, supra note 66, at 498 (discussing the impact of new technology
on the gathering, storing, transferring, and surveillance of personal data as well as the
weak judicial response to these challenges).
80. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 39, at arts. 5-7.
81. See id. at arts. 9-11.
82. In Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96, 32377/99, 29 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 548 (2000), for example, the Eur. Ct. H. R. held that "the hallmarks" of a
democratic society include "pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness." Id. 80. None
of these attributes can be said to be incontrovertible attributes of the core meaning of
democracy; indeed, none are democratic values in a classical view of democracy. In fact,
the court in Lustig-Prean assumed a historically highly contingent conception of liberal
democracy where the requirements of majority rule are tampered by a high degree of
social liberalism and perhaps even permissiveness.
83. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, the meaning of the concepts of the rule of law and
procedural justice is inseparable from the notions of non-retrospectivity;
certainty; equality before the law, between the parties, and of access to
the law; effective law enforcement; and extensive procedural safeguards.
Any combination and hierarchical ordering between those aspects may
be claimed to be the correct conception of the rule of law; conversely,
none of these can be definitely ruled out as irrelevant and few of the
various orderings of these concepts can be conclusively dismissed as
irrational.
This demonstrates that where a right either amounts to an ECC or is
justified in terms of such a concept, its meaning is essentially
indeterminable. Its application, therefore, is not only likely to give rise
to judicial disagreement and inconsistency in adjudication as a matter of
practice, but does so inevitably and analytically because there cannot be
theoretical agreement about the meaning.
C. The Essential Contestability of the Concepts Constitutive of Rights
Limitations
Human rights are, of course, subject to limitations of scope. These
limitations take account of the potential for conflict between individual
rights or between rights and public interest and security considerations.
Furthermore, the effect of these limitations sets the parameters for the
judicial resolution of such conflict. The ECHR does not adopt a single
unified approach to limiting the scope of the rights it protects but does so
in different ways. Two in particular deserve mention: first, the
limitations of Articles 8 through 11 of the ECHR, which are subject to
certain qualifying conditions and, second, Article 15 of the ECHR, which
allows signatory states to derogate from part of the ECHR for reasons of
war or public emergency. In practice, however, the degree to which such
limitations constrain judicial discretion is only minimal. By allowing the
judiciary to show deference to the executive in sensitive areas, such as
national security or public order, the limits allow both the Eur. Ct. H.R.
and the domestic courts implementing ECHR rights to avoid political
controversy in sensitive policy areas where decisions upholding human
rights might have met with political or public hostility. Thus, the courts
have strengthened, rather than weakened their ability to adopt a more
expansive approach to human rights in those fashionable areas of social
policy that have little, if any, direct fiscal implications.
8 4
The principal reason for the failure of these limitations to rein in
84. This is generally true of laws promoting social equality which may have
economic costs that are difficult to quantify and do not commonly have immediate
budgetary implications or effects on personal taxation.
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judicial discretion again can be found in the persistence of the problem of
conceptual vagueness. Many of the limitations are defined-expressly or
impliedly-with reference to legitimate aims that are based on concepts
that are just as essentially contestable as those defining the rights they are
designed to qualify. Articles 8 through 11 of the ECHR, for instance,
make reference to a range of legitimate policy objectives whose
conceptual vagueness mirrors, rather than reduces, that of the rights and
liberties which they are designed to limit. Examples of the legitimate
aims enumerated include the protection of health or morals, protection of
public order, national security, and the prevention of disorder and crime.
Although some of these concepts are less vague than others, their
meaning cannot be settled objectively and judges may, therefore, rightly
differ about their proper use.
The problem of vagueness resulting from the conceptual and
empirical indeterminability of key concepts in Articles 8 through 11 of
the ECHR is exacerbated by the requirement that the qualifications shall
not exceed what is "necessary in a democratic society." Together with
the conceptual ambiguity of the provisions themselves, the inclusion of
the principle of proportionality as an essential condition of any legitimate
qualification of those rights amounts to an invitation to the courts to
make value judgments behind the veil of legal objectivity.
85
An excellent example is provided by the English case of R. (on the
application of Gillian and Quinton) v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis,86 where the Divisional Court was asked judicially to review
police powers to stop and search under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act
of 2000. Under the Act, the police may be granted power to randomly
stop and search individuals without need to suspect that the individual is
a terrorist or has been involved in acts of terrorism. 87 However, the
85. Under the ECHR, judicial discretion in all matters of rights qualifications and the
derogations under Article 15 is complicated further by the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and
Universal Standards, 31 J. INT'L L. & POL. 843 (1999); Thomas A. O'Donnell, The
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474 (1982). This doctrine requires the court to defer to
a signatory state's interpretation of the situation in allowing a limitation on the rights
guaranteed by the ECHR. The reasoning behind the doctrine is partly to allow States to
make judgment they are better place to make but likewise to allow the Eur. Ct. H.R. not
to get embroiled in political controversies with national governments. The doctrine,
however, does not extend to the domestic situations where national courts are asked to
enforce the ECHR against the executive. It follows that in relation to the same ECHR
right the Eur. Ct. H.R. may justifiably defer to a national government, while an English
court, which must handle domestic controversies cannot. English cases involving
national security issues within the HRA framework suggest that the courts remain
reluctant to exercise their enhanced judicial scrutiny and review function.
86. R. v. Commissioner of the Police of Metropolis, [2003] EWHC 2545.
87. The facts of the case were such that the two applicants, in Gillian and Quinton
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ECHR has manifestly asked the courts to carry out a balancing exercise
between individual rights and public security and safety. Regardless of
this request, the Divisional Court found no reason to question the
compatibility of the blanket stop and search authorisation powers under
the Act with respect to Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR and decided
that the judicial function in scrutinising a power or decision of this kind
was necessarily a limited one. 8 In effect, the court chose to exercise its
discretion by not exercising it and by deferring to the authority of the
policymaker despite the ECHR provisions mandating judicial review. In
the areas of public safety and national security-those areas where rights
abuses are arguably most likely to occur and could potentially be most
serious-conceptual vagueness surrounding the qualifications of, and the
derogation from, ECHR rights appears to have favoured excessive
judicial deference, rather than judicial activism. Judicial deference and
judicial activism, of course, are the two extremes of judicial discretion.
A further, more disquieting example of the almost complete
freedom enjoyed by judges under the HRA when seeking to balance the
requirements of individual liberty under Articles 5 and 8 of the ECHR
with the demands of national security, and particularly of the higher
threshold of public emergency under Article 15 of the ECHR, is the case
of A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.89  This case
involved the issue of a possible serious breach of the right to liberty
under Article 5 of the ECHR in connection with the U.K. Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001. The Act gave the Home
Secretary power to imprison people indefinitely without trial under the
Article 15 derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR "in time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation." The Special
Immigration Appeals Commission ("SIAC"), which was asked at first
instance to review the Home Secretary's decision to make the derogation
under Article 15, vindicated the executive detention without qualification
or reluctance. The SIAC found that there was "a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation" and that "imprisonment without trial"
had tried to join a demonstration against an arms fair but were detained and searched and,
as a result, they were prevented from joining the demonstration. Both applicants were of
good character and nothing incriminating was found. In one instance the search of the
applicant's rucksack merely yielded a sandwich, a notebook and print-outs which the
police confiscated. The other applicant was searched in spite of wearing a
photographer's jacket and press pass. The Divisional Court did not question the decision
to grant the authorisation, nor the manner of its exercise in this particular case.
88. See id. T 35, quoting Lord Justice Brooke, "The assessment of risk to the public
safety and to national security... are primarily for the Government and Parliament on
grounds of public legitimacy."
89. A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1502, [2004] Q.B.
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was "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." 90 The SIAC
further held that "the United Kingdom could be distinguished from its
neighbors," which had not found it necessary to derogate because the
United Kingdom was "a prime target" and an attack against the United
Kingdom would be "devastating."9'
The Court of Appeal appeared to agree with this part of the
decision. Lord Chief Justice Woolf conceded that the threshold for a
derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR is higher than that required by
the interests of national security built into Article 5 of the ECHR but
went on to conclude that "the same general approach is clearly
appropriate. 92 The Court of Appeal even overruled the SIAC on the
point of the actions taken to deal with the emergency, ruling that the
SIAC had erred in not showing deference to the executive on this point.
According to the Lord Chief Justice:
Whether the Secretary of State was entitled to come to the conclusion
that action was only necessary in relation to non-national suspected
terrorists, who could not be deported, is an issue on which it is
impossible for this court in this case to differ from the Secretary of
State. Decisions as to what is required in the interest of national
security are self-evidently within the category of decisions in relation
to which the court is required to show considerable deference to the
Secretary of State because he is better qualified to make an
assessment as to what action is called for.
93
The House of Lords later departed from the established practice of
judicial deference in national security and emergency cases and reversed
the Court of Appeals.94  However, this only reinforces the image of
unbridled judicial discretion on a central issue of civil liberties. Besides,
an appeal to the House of Lords does not lie as of right and will often be
beyond the reach of most litigants who are neither publicly funded nor
possess the deep pockets of public bodies and private corporations.
Remarkably, in both cases the courts were simply able to avoid a
politically sensitive issue and potential clash with the executive by
choosing not to exercise a crystal-clear duty to review both legislative
and executive measures under the HRA. The reasons for this near
complete freedom lie both in the vagueness of the underlying concepts
and the absence of any common standard into which the respective gains





94. A. v. Secretary for the Homeland Department, [2004] UKHL 56, available at
2004 WL 2810935.
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Judicial trade-offs between incommensurable values thus remain
unconstrained by rational choice because it cannot be demonstrated that
the loss of liberty required by some measures is either greater or more
limited than the correlative gains in security. No one can say how much
security is enough and how many "x" units of liberty should be sacrificed
for "y" gains in security. Nor, can one say at what point the suspension
of civil liberties in the name of making democracy safe will actually
transform the democratic order itself into an authoritarian state which no
longer safeguards civil liberties and thus ceases to be worthy of
protection in their name.95
Believers in legal certainty, of course, will point out that such trade-
offs need not be arbitrary, but are made with reference to legal principles.
The rationality of judicial trade-offs between conflicting rights thus
depends crucially on the clarity and precision of the legal principles that
resolve such rights clashes. The alleged autonomy of these principles
and their ability to fill the gaps where legal rules run out-a position
associated in particular with Dworkin-is central to the final argument
that human rights are not simply just what judges say they are.
D. The Conceptual In-determinability ofLegal Principles
A problem common to all legal systems consists in the need for
legal certainty in situations where legal rules run out either because of
their lack of precision or the vagueness of the concepts contained in
them. Central to both civil law and common law systems is the
assumption that in these circumstances, legal principles can provide
objective reasons capable of constraining judicial discretion. Legal
principles, however, can provide answers that escape the pluralistic
dilemma only if they are not themselves subject to conceptual vagueness
and can be divorced from appeal to underlying normative considerations.
Neither is the case here.
All human rights theories include or presuppose general principles
of law. In the case of the ECHR, the principle of proportionality which
governs the application requires a reasonable relation between the goal
95. The above examples illustrating the vagueness and elasticity of many human
rights limitations have been drawn from the ECHR but equivalent provisions have been
developed in other human rights systems. In the US, for instance, the Supreme Court has
developed the "clear and present danger" and "bad tendency" tests for limiting free
speech, and the equal protection clause which generally prohibits differential treatment
of similarly situated people on the grounds of race and sex. In turn, these are qualified by
the "rational basis" and "compelling government interest" tests. For a brief exposition of
judge-made limitations on the rights in the U.S. Constitution, see A.T. MASON & D.G.
STEPHENSON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 473-74, 618-20 (Charlyce J. Owen ed.,
Prentice Hall, 14th ed. 2005).
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pursued and the means used. The principle has its origin in German
constitutional law where it is known as the
Verhdltnismij3igkeitsgrundsatz. Via the HRA, it has been imported into
English domestic law and, although in name proportionality may not
exis in other legal systems, in substance, it is an established general
principle of law in all human rights jurisdictions. In the U.S., for
example, the Supreme Court has grafted the "rational basis test" onto the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law.96
Author Robert Alexy makes strong claims for the rationality of cost-
benefit balancing exercises based on proportionality. He argues that
proportionality expresses the idea of optimisation, requiring that
constitutional rights be realised to the greatest possible extent given the
legal constraints posed by the demands of conflicting rights and other
interests. 97  Alexy's examples are instructive. In the first case, the
Federal German Constitutional Court98 held that health warnings for
tobacco products were a relatively minor interference with the
constitutional freedoms of occupation and commerce. The health risks
from smoking were high, and so represented weighty reasons justifying
the interference. However, the court opined that a "total ban" on the sale
of tobacco might not have been proportionate.99 Alexy's second
example, the Titanic Case, involved a claim brought by a paraplegic
reserve officer against a magazine that had described him as "a born
murderer" and "a cripple." This case raised the classic conflict between
the incommensurables of respect for personality and freedom of
expression. 100 The Federal Constitutional Court held that the former
statement was a comparatively trivial interference with the integrity of
the claimant, whereas the latter statement went to the root of his identity
and self-respect. The interference with freedom of expression was held
to be disproportionate in the former but not the latter case.
However, Alexy's claim for the rationalisation or optimisation of
trade-offs based on proportionality fails for the following reason: Alexy
ultimately assumes that rights are transitive, quantifiable interests and
capable of evaluation in terms of a common unit, such as money or
utility. Incommensurable values precisely lack transitivity and
comparability. It follows that, while Alexy may show that the outcomes
are rational in the sense of being structured and neither arbitrary nor
unreflective, he fails to show that the answers have any special claim to
96. Id. at 473-74.
97. Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, in RATIO JURIS
131-40 (June 2003).
98. Id. at 136.
99. Id. at 187.
100. Id. at 137.
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moral "truth" or "objectivity." It is submitted that, generally, the
principle of proportionality cannot provide objective answers for judicial
balancing exercises for several reasons. Above all, the principle of
proportionality can only come into operation once a specific aim has
been selected. The implication is that in the conflict between two rights
(for example, privacy and freedom of choice, or individual rights and
national security) a basic choice favouring one value over another has to
be made by the judges even before any discussion of proportionality can
take place. In the English cases discussed above, security was prioritised
and proportionality only came into play as a means of assessing whether
certain measures involving losses of individual liberty were suitable and
necessary to achieve the selected aim. However, this is possible only if
there is transitivity between the various rights and interests concerned.
In the absence of value transitivity all judicial value transactions amount
to short change. The same is true of purported trade-offs between
privacy and freedom of expression. In Hannover v. Germany,0 1 the
court referred to the proportionality of the interference. However, it is
not possible to express in common currency the comparative normative
or legal weight of the subjective discomfort resulting from intrusions into
a person's privacy set against the aggregate loss resulting from
restrictions of freedom of expression.
Moreover, in many cases the choice between ECHR rights or
between such a right and national security is an all-or-nothing choice.
For example, a demonstration under Article 11 of the ECHR is either to
be allowed or to be prohibited. Furthermore, an article invading
someone's privacy is either to be published or not. Finally, if the recent
headscarf debate in both France and the United Kingdom is to be finally
resolved judicially, the right to follow religious precept will either
prevail or give way to public order considerations.
A particularly striking misuse of the proportionality principle
occurred in Van Kiick v. Germany.10 2 The case involved a claim by a
transsexual for reimbursement of her gender re-assignment surgery by
her private medical insurance. The Eur. Ct. H.R. purportedly did not
make any finding regarding the entitlement to such expenses but found
that the requirement to prove the necessity of surgery and "genuine
nature" of the applicant's condition was disproportionate and in conflict
with her right to self-determination. Leaving aside that there is no such
right under the provisions of the ECHR, it is unclear what, if anything,
could be described as disproportionate. Instead, the appropriate principle
to apply in the case should have been the principle of non-discrimination
101. von Hannover v. Germany, supra note 40.
102. Van Kick v Germany, supra note 68.
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in order to establish if the applicant had been treated discriminatorily by
reference to others placed in an analogous position.
Finally, proportionality assessments as to what is necessary to
achieve an appropriate goal often require detailed or technical knowledge
that judges rarely possess or find difficult to evaluate when presented
with. Moreover, in national security cases not all the relevant
information is usually made available to courts. Lack of information and
technical expertise often reinforce and strengthen pre-existing judicial
dispositions to show significant deference to political authority in
national security cases.
The principle of equality as non-discrimination is another key
principle found in most charters of rights. In the ECHR it is enshrined in
Article 14 of the ECHR, which prohibits discrimination on any grounds
with respect to all ECHR rights and then adds a non-exclusive list of
particular discriminatory grounds which are prohibited. 0 3 The basic idea
behind Article 14 seems clear: an applicant must establish that he is
subject to a difference in treatment from others in a comparable,
analogous or relevantly similar'0 4 position in the enjoyment of one of the
rights guaranteed under the ECHR unless that difference in treatment can
be objectively and reasonably justified. Obvious problems arise over
what precisely counts as "comparable" or "analogous." It is the answer
to these questions that decides which cases should be treated alike and
which should be treated differently. Good examples are provided by
those cases in which national governments sought to justify differential
treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children and between
unmarried and married couples. Inze v. Austria'0 5 and Mazureck v.
France'0 6 both discussed the issue of inheritance rights of illegitimate
children and the Eur. Ct. H.R. held in both cases that differential
treatment of children born in and out of wedlock was a breach of Article
14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR. By contrast, the court has
on several occasions accepted arguments that married couples were not
in an analogous position with unmarried couples and affirmed that
marriage had a special status that grounded a distinct corpus of rights and
obligations. Specific examples have arisen mainly in cases involving
differences in the parental rights and responsibility over children
accruing to natural fathers as compared to married and divorced fathers.
103. The inclusion of some of those discriminatory grounds, such as property, is
patently absurd, as personal wealth obviously affects the ability to seek legal address and
advice or indeed the extent of one's private sphere from which one may have a right to
exclude others. In contrast, the inclusion of both race and colour is superfluous.
104. Markx v. Belgium, [June 13, 1979] 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 330.
105. Inze v. Austria, 10 E.H.R.R. 394, [1987] Eur. Ct. H.R. 28.
106. Mazurek v. France, App. No. 34406/97, [2000] Eur. Ct. H.R. 48.
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On the whole, the court has accepted that differential treatment of natural
fathers was justified in view of the difference in the nature of
relationships of fathers with children born out of wedlock.1 °7 It is clear
that together with the "objective and reasonably justified" proviso, the
"relevantly similar situation" criterion, which has been developed by the
Eur. Ct. H.R. as a test to distinguish between material differences and
similarities for the purposes of Article 14 of the ECHR, gives the court
considerable flexibility in refusing to extend the equal treatment
principle to cases where it considers discriminatory treatment justified on
the grounds of social or economic policy or other reasons. The court
here effectively assumes the role of policy-maker.
Fairness is the overriding principle for the determination of the
specific procedural justice guarantees of Article 6 of the ECHR. In
theory, the right to a fair hearing is absolute with no express
qualifications. In practice, however, it is qualified by the inherent
vagueness of the concept of fairness, which has allowed the Eur. Ct. H.R.
to avoid politically contentious decisions and show deference to national
legal traditions. For example, the availability of legal aid or reasonable
contingency fee arrangements is undeniably one of the most important
facilities for aggrieved parties to secure effective access to a court in the
determination of their civil rights. Yet, unsurprisingly, the court has
acknowledged that no general right to receive legal aid or access to
affordable fee arrangements exists except in highly exceptional
circumstances.
0 8
National courts, when applying ECHR provisions, have likewise
used the "fairness and impartiality" requirement under Article 6 to avoid
making decisions with budgetary implications or decisions that would
conflict with established national legal traditions. A good example is
provided by the Alconbury decision of the House of Lords,'0 9 which
involved a challenge to the entire English planning system on the
grounds that the reserve jurisdiction of the Secretary of State over
planning appeal decisions was in breach of Article 6(1) of the ECHR.
Their lordships dismissed the challenge. Central to the conclusion was
the claim that in democracies decisions concerning the general interest
should be taken by democratically accountable bodies.110 Planning
decisions, they opined, fall into that category, and so properly fall within
107. McMichael v United Kingdom, [1995] 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 205.
108. Such as extreme complexity of proceedings or cases where legal representation
is compulsory. See KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed., London 2004).
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the remit of the decision-making powers of the Secretary of State. As a
political theory their lordships' conclusions may be convincing to
political freshmen. However, as a matter of law, it remains unclear how
a tribunal that the Government created for the purpose of deciding
disputes between planning authorities and developers, which involves the
interpretation of government legislation and planning policy, may be
regarded as impartial when the Secretary of State reserves the right to
call-in any decision by the planning tribunal hearing the case.
Indeed, the fact that governments quite appropriately legislate for
the public interest in such matters, or formulate policy documents on this
basis, in no way means that there neither should nor could be an
independent check on the application of that policy. For example, in
conflicts between Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR the courts are
constantly asked to adjudicate whether the disclosure of personal
information or other speech requires protection in the general interest.
The same applies in relation to other cases involving the right to property
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR or the public interest
exceptions to the right to private life, which are unrelated to Article 10 of
the ECHR. Why, therefore, is it not desirable, possible or appropriate for
planning tribunals to decide what the public interest requires in specific
cases on the basis of government legislation, policy and guidelines? This
is the question their lordships fail to answer. However, Alconbury draws
attention to the degree of discretion afforded by the principles of fairness
and impartiality in the context of the putatively absolute fair trail
guarantee of Article 6 of the ECHR.
V. Conclusion
Rights are not worded precisely enough to prevent value conflict.
Neither are legal principles sufficiently clear, autochthonous and
hierarchical so as to overcome the dependence of human rights
adjudication on foundationalist values, and nor can they escape the
normative dilemmas and conceptual ambiguities attendant to those
foundationalist values. In cases where conflict between legally
recognised rights arise, there will always be choices between conflicting
rights, which can only be justified in terms of the values underlying those
rights. Thus, for as long as the de facto human rights recognized in
human rights instruments are capable of colliding and, in addition, might
also collide with public security or other public interest requirements, the
philosophical dilemma of value pluralism remains relevant to the judicial
and political choices that need to be made in such cases. Competing
pluralistic values are ethically and legally indeterminate and cannot
furnish detailed prescriptions of how rights may be balanced best. Value
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pluralism means that indeterminacy in human rights adjudication is not
merely an unavoidable consequence of legislative and judicial fallibility,
but a logical result of normative necessity.
It is common to draw a distinction, often a stark one, between the
issue of a philosophical justification for human rights and the less
abstract issue of bringing coherence into judicial and political human
rights language as the basis for criticism of adjudication and legislation.
This strict juxtaposition is mistaken. The foregoing discussion has
shown that the normative and conceptual contestability of human rights
raises fundamental normative questions about the justification for
judicial value judgments. Likewise, this discussion calls into question
the very basis for the distinction between political and judicial judgments
as both seem inescapably wedded to value judgments. Judicial decisions
defining the meaning of individual rights, or balancing the countervailing
requirements of competing rights, lack both a distinctive justifiable legal
and normative foundation. They lack certainty, not simply as a matter of
experience, but by logical necessity, and consequently share the
characteristics of political decisions and balancing acts. Just as any bill
of rights must be regarded as essentially a political document to the
extent to which its provisions are incapable of rational justification in
terms of a coherent ideal of human ends but explicable above all in terms
of political choices made in a particular political and social context.
Value pluralism and conceptual uncertainty thus do not only provide a
useful theoretical framework for analysing the use and abuse of judicial
discretion in human rights adjudication; they likewise undermine the idea
of human rights as ultimate legal values in a society characterised by
ethical pluralism. There is nothing that renders human rights
normatively less contentious than many other contested moral or political
concepts. Human rights therefore lack the overriding normative status
that is commonly assumed in justifying their privileged legal status, and
they likewise lack the attributes of clarity, precision or non-reducibility
that would facilitate or allow for their justiciability in a way in which the
conceptual structure of other moral claims does not. In the absence of
moral truth, the priority of the right over the good seems morally
arbitrary, judges make rights, and their choices remain political.
The above discussion suggests that, ultimately, human rights are
what the judge says they are. If Professor Backer is correct in the
analysis of the reconstitution of legal reification as Global Common
Law, then in the context of global corporations and transnational
organised interests, this finding will acquire a further and even more
sinister dimension. Human rights will then become the jurisdictio by
which private interests will constrain gubernaculum.
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